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Abstract: This article examines the notion of the right to equality, considerate of South Africa’s 
perspective of constitutional democracy which has embedded human rights philosophy at the bedrock 
of its redistributive justice. The article derives strength from Aristotelian view on equality, and 
examines how transformative constitutionalism envisioned advancing substantive equality with the 
view of restoring society’s sound social and economic relations. It has been observed that equality, in 
its formal or substantive form, will remain a distant dream owing to spiraling triple social challenges 
of unemployment, poverty and inequalities. These social problems have been given added impetus by 
pervasive trends of dualistic public-private services existing across all sectors of society. This public-
private service is class-based, and largely perpetuates inequalities. Thus, South Africa’s legal 
normative framework, often globally commended, is yet to meaningfully infuse into everyday social 
realities.  
Keywords: equality; human rights; transformative constitutionalism social transformation 
 
1. Introduction 
The epilogue to the 1993 Interim Constitution posited the notion of ‘equality’ as 
one of fundamental ideals that epitomized South Africa’s constitutional project of 
transformation. This would augment the process of transforming the nation from a 
deeply divided past, a society that was characterized by strife, conflict, untold 
suffering and injustices, to that which is grounded on democratic values, social 
justice and protection of fundamental human rights (Small and Grant, 2000). This it 
pursues by affirming that a future founded on recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South 
Africans irrespective of race, class, colour, belief or sex, is indispensable to the 
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new democratic dispensation (Langa, 2006). Thus, equality evolves as an all-
encompassing norm which covers wide ranging aspects in society, inclusive of 
social interfaces, gender, religion, racial, tribal, economic and political landscapes 
amongst others. Indeed, this has been given added impetus by South Africa’s 
polarized past which was factually characterized by exclusivity premised on 
patriarchal tenets founded mainly to bestow exclusive enjoyment of secure 
livelihood to minority race group in society. Hence, the right to equality is an 
integral part of South Africa’s history, present jurisprudence and shall continue to 
play a crucial function in modelling the country’s transformation agenda, its 
friendliness towards the human rights ideology, social settings and people’s 
relations and legal developments at large. 
In perspective, it has been twenty one years since South Africa made a 
groundbreaking transition and leaped into a democratic dispensation premised on 
constitutional supremacy. This 1994 democratic dispensation officially brought an 
end to apartheid, a long-standing repressive regime which retains the status of 
dismal human rights record in the history of South Africa (Sarkin, 1999; Landsberg 
and Mackay, 2006). The apartheid regime embedded widespread systems of 
political, economic and social discrimination and disenfranchisement (Klotz, 
1995), thereby rendering the right to equality a dispensable theory. This enabled 
structural inequalities on race, economic and geographical grounds to be a common 
phenomenon (Ngwena, 2000). Therefore the 1994 transition explicitly culminated 
in high optimism that all citizens would from then onward be afforded the right to 
equality, which would be fully respected and protected under law. Perhaps, it is 
significant to note that the majority of South Africans supported the broader cause 
of fighting to eliminate apartheid because in principle, they yearned for equality 
before the law, and that was in accordance with aspirations of safeguarding and 
advancing preservation of human worth. The primary goal was arguably to seek an 
end to inequalities and unjustifiable discrimination (Currie & de Waal, 2005), 
which were prevalent in both public and private domain, as were discernible in the 
content and application of the law itself (Albertyn, 2007).  
 
2. Rationale and Methodology 
At the center of attention in this article is the notion of the ‘right to equality’. It is 
written from social, economic and legal perspectives. The primary purpose of this 
article is to consider the importance of the right to equality within the context of 
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South Africa’s process of redress which has mainly been pursued through the 
phenomenon of transformative constitutionalism. The article illustrates that indeed 
South Africa has succeeded in founding an appealing human rights normative 
framework which excellently embraced international Bill of Rights (which 
includes, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - UDHR, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – ICCPR (first generation rights), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – ICESCR 
(second generation rights)). This enabled the right to equality to infuse swiftly in 
the post 1994 constitutional dispensation. This article also seeks to show the 
inherent significance of law and humanitarian values/beliefs in safeguarding 
human worth. The article attempts to respond to a question whether the right to 
equality has been realized in meaningful terms? And whether equality is still 
achievable considering the context of South Africa’s notable challenges of 
persistent poverty, soaring levels of unemployment and widespread socio-
economic inequalities? The article analyses equality as a value in moral, social, 
legal and political perspectives. It is argued that South Africa’s transformative 
constitutionalism require more than just an appealing normative value system. It 
indicts that more be done to translate the right to equality into reality. Hence, the 
extent to which second generation (socio-economic rights) and third generation 
rights are realized (the right to development) is used for assessing progress of 
equality right. 
This article is descriptive and adapts to qualitative style of research. It utilized 
primary and secondary sources, as data derived from written texts which includes 
statutes, policies, international instruments and scholarly publications. The author 
also relied on his personal experiences, and insights obtained from interacting with 
the people inhabiting the areas of Mopani and Capricorn Districts, Limpopo 
Province. 
 
3. The Meaning of Equality and its Right Content 
The sta rting point rightfully vests in obtaining a clearer understanding on what is 
meant by the notion of equality, and as a right. Equality has been noted to connote 
the need to modelling a certain kind of relationship between beings and/or entities 
that are deemed same and equal in nature and form (Sen, 1980). However, it is 
crucial to note first and foremost that, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (hereinafter, the Constitution), does not provide a definition on what 
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constitute equality. Instead, the Constitution essentially provides a normative 
framework within which to ascribe the meaning of equality, both as a value and as 
a right. Does being equal require that people should be the same, identical or have 
corresponding elements of being? In response, the implicit meaning of equality as 
derived from the Constitution is that every South African should benefit in an equal 
manner from the tenets of legal imperatives. This entails that the post 1994 regime 
has had to ensure that everyone receives equal protection of the law and is similarly 
afforded unhindered equal opportunities which otherwise would not have been 
realized under apartheid. Recognizing the diverse nature of the country’s 
population demographics, the Constitution does not define equality as a means to 
attempt to render people uniform or similar in skin pigmentation. Rather it defines 
equality within the context of addressing matters of access to justice, socio-
economic entitlements and development, issues of race, gender, ethnicity and so 
forth. The Constitution further implores everyone to recognize that diverse as we 
are, we should unite, with the understanding that we are all humans, worth of 
respect, protection and better livelihood. Therefore, in terms of section 9(3), the 
Constitution places upon everyone, a moral obligation to treat every other person 
equally and fairly, and not to discriminate unfairly against anyone on the basis of 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language or birth. 
The fact that human beings can never be identical is indisputable. This entails that 
there is often a way of differentiating between people depending on what is 
intended and what purposes are served by such differentiation. This then invokes 
the need to differentiate mechanisms of differentiating humans; that is, formal and 
substantive equality. This assists in understanding the practical application of the 
right to equality and its social impact. 
 
3.1. Formal Equality 
Formal equality simply connotes sameness, equal and/or similar treatment to 
people in the same situation. It requires that the law must treat people in the same 
manner irrespective of circumstances they may find themselves in (Westen, 1982; 
De Waal, 2002; Currie and De Waal, 2005; Smith and McLaughlin, 2011; Smith, 
2014). The formal conceptualization of equality entails that inequalities can be 
eliminated by extending the same rights and entitlement to all people in accordance 
with common acceptable standards. In terms of section 9(2), the Constitution states 
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that equality necessitates full and equal enjoyment of all other rights and freedom. 
Hence, when literally interpreted, formal equality fails to advance the wishes of 
transformative constitutionalism. For instance, such an approach to equality would 
often make it difficult or impossible for people with special needs to realize 
equality. The right to equality will not be achieved if all children, including those 
with impaired eyesight (disability of vision), were to attend school and conduct 
their lessons in the same manner. It is for this reason that it may be necessary to 
treat such children with disability differently, in an attempt to bring them at a level 
where they will easily cope and catch-up with learning and its inherent challenges. 
 
3.2. Substantive Equality 
The essence of substantive equality vests in the fact that it requires the law to take 
into account people’s varied circumstances which needs special attention to ensure 
similar favourable outcome to all. This was emphasized in National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality & Another v Minister of Justice & others 1999 (1) SA 6 
(CC): paras 60-62. The substantive idea of equality takes into account the social 
and economic conditions of individuals and historically disadvantaged groups in 
society. Substantive equality asserts that even though we are different, unique, with 
various talents, law in the Constitution ought to be utilized to mitigate adverse 
effects of such inherent differences. According to Albertyn and Kentridge (1994), 
the substantive approach to equality is among tenets that underpin the vision of 
South Africa’s democracy as embodied in the Constitution, 1996. In its expansive 
outlook, substantive equality seeks to accommodate and address social and 
economic disparities that may exist between individuals and/or group of persons 
with the view to redressing subordination and inequality among a people (Loenen, 
1997). 
 
4. Context of Equality: Theoretical Framework 
Rightfully, the prominence of the notion of equality has embedded its moral, legal, 
socio-economic and political significance in society as a guiding tenet of life. This 
is discernible particularly through a variety of disciplines of academic scholarship, 
including but not limited to law and legal studies, politics, philosophy, humanities 
and various other areas of social sciences studies. It is for this reason that literature 
containing essential narratives with regard to the right to equality is reasonably 
widespread. For purposes of this article, attention is on existing literature that 
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reflects on equality in its historical context, from constitutional and democratic 
perspectives, as a transformative and justice restoration tool, and more importantly, 
as a human rights normative value which is interlinked with the right to dignity and 
development of persons. This review reflects on equality from moral, legal, 
political and social perspectives. 
The historical conceptualization of equality can be traced through philosophical 
thoughts of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the presence of equality constitutes a 
manifestation of justice in its expansive form. He posited equality as an effective 
tool premised on the theory of distributive justice. This distributive justice is also 
referred to as “equality of resources”, which places special emphasis on people’s 
responsibility for the choices they make, as it aspires to a political morality that 
make sense in terms of citizen’s internal practices of moral and ethical criticism, 
including self-criticism (Dworkin, 2002). Aristotle argued that equality embodies 
and advocates equal distribution of wealth and resources, within a political system 
designed to affirm sustainable livelihood. Aristotelian formula of right to equality 
primarily postulated that “like should be treated alike”, which insists that 
individuals should at all times be treated alike regardless of attributes such as race, 
gender and so forth (Wesson, 2007). Thus, Aristotle subscribes more to formal 
equality. The Aristotelian view has the effect of accepting selective equalization 
and some inequalities to prevail, as long as such does not encumber the ultimate 
desire of having equality to serve justice even under diverse situations. Although 
his conceptualization tended to be more on formal equality which is not considered 
preferable for constitutionalism, Aristotle accepted that equality constitute an 
effective tool which makes democracy functional (Gurin, et al 2002). 
The scholarly works of Ronald Dworkin with regards to interpretation methods 
cannot escape attention, especially with regards to matters that derive strength from 
constitutional law, as is the case with the right to equality. Dworkin’s interpretive 
theory of putting the Constitution in its best light is important because it proffers 
greater clarity on what effect the right to equality has in safeguarding and 
advancing fundamental constitutional values. So, linking Aristotle’s theory on 
equality of resources, Dworkin’s (2001) interpretive technique posits this theory as 
a tenet which requires equality of treatment even with regards to any resources that 
are owned privately by individuals. However, he expounded equality of resources 
(distributive justice) as an isolated theory from equality of political power 
especially pertaining to publicly or commonly owned resources. His reasoning was 
that from a perspective of sophisticated economic theory, individual’s command 
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over public resources is part of his private resources. Thus, a theory of equality 
must find a way of integrating private resources and political power. 
From a constitutional perspective, South Africa subscribes to the theory of 
constitutionalism, which is a doctrine governing the legitimacy of government 
action (Burns, 2003) in the interest of its citizens, and in order to protect right to 
equality amongst others (De Villiers, 1994). Constitutionalism entails that 
government derives its existence or powers from the Constitution (Currie and De 
Waal, 2005). Consequently, how does equality infuse into this system? Smith 
(2008) shed some light by examining the difficulties encountered in 
constitutionalizing equality, taking into account South Africa’s choice of 
constitutional supremacy premised on constitutionalism. This contribution reflected 
on the importance of taking into account, real policy (social) and political issues in 
the formulation and entrenchment of equality clause in the Constitution. Smith 
emphasized that the right to equality must occupy a key role in any Bill of Rights, 
and stated that this is practically discernible in the case of South African 
Constitution in which equality clause appear as the first right in the Bill of Rights. 
She however pointed out that while we might yearn for absolute equality, it is not 
possible to achieve absolute equality by legal formulation. This postulated that 
legal normative framework should go as far as inculcating an ideology that is 
socially responsive in conscientizing society about equality as a value and right. 
Only then would meaningful realization of equality emerge. 
The theory of equality also comes across as a social moral value. This concerns a 
recognition that all humans are born with equal worth or value. Arising out of such 
an understanding is inherent interrelatedness between equality and dignity of 
persons, ideals which are essentially strategic for South Africa’s transformation 
agenda. This is necessitated by the fact that human dignity is an inviolable doctrine 
whose social value towards human kind is self-enduring and unparalleled (Rapatsa, 
2015). Thus, it is considered as a humanist imperative, that refer to worthiness or 
excellence of humans by virtue of being humans (De Crunchy, 2011). According to 
Grant (2007), dignity provides a properly grounded theory derived from its rich 
tradition that has been accepted as being capable of underpinning an appropriate 
approach to equality. Grant posits that using dignity to safeguard equality is crucial 
because it helps us avoid excessive individualism and fully recognizes the interplay 
between individuals’ sense of self and community needs. Thus, dignity-based 
approach to human rights augment progressive frameworks that work to remedy 
instances of discrimination, while creating a society where all persons are valued 
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equally. When dignity of persons is appropriately safeguarded, humans are able to 
assert their anchored freedom and equality in real terms (Pufendorf, 1958). In S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR (CC): 28, Justice Kate O’Regan emphasized that 
human dignity is a tool through which humans can recognize that everyone is 
worth of equal respect and protection, in both social and legal terms. 
Cowen (2001) also examined whether South Africa’s connotation of ‘dignity’ 
could be utilized to guide jurisprudence on equality. In the main, Cowen defends 
the use of human dignity as a value in developing better progressive frameworks 
for equality jurisprudence. She showed that dignity’s central role in developing 
jurisprudence of quality manifest in three ways, namely; first, that dignity is 
essential in determining whether there is discrimination on a ground not specified 
in section 9(3) of the Constitution. Second, whether such discrimination is fair or 
unfair, and third, if found to be unfair, whether such discrimination, in terms of a 
law of general application, is nevertheless justifiable under the section 36 
(limitations clause). The inherent interrelatedness of dignity and equality is seen 
through widespread anti-discrimination jurisprudence which has been given added 
impetus by the need to uphold these fundamental values. In accordance with Kant’s 
theory, humans occupy a special place in creation, and an intrinsic worth of dignity 
incomparable to that of any creatures (Rachels, 1986; Shell, 2008). According to 
Liebenberg (2005), Kant theory entails that all humans should relate to each other 
as having intrinsic worth as persons, and therefore afford each other the desired 
equality. In a nutshell, dignity as a right and a value has been central in the 
interpretation and application of all rights in the Bill of Rights. This was 
emphasized in Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
(CCT35/99) [2000] ZACC 8; 2000 (3) SA 936, that dignity informs how all other 
rights ought to be viewed. Succinctly, Evadne Grant and Susie Cowen illustrates 
that dignity safeguards and advances equality, and correspondingly, equality 
augment efforts to realize protection of human dignity, all in accordance with 
transformative ideals that resonate precepts of preserving human worth. 
Kalula and Leslie, (2001) provided an editorial with regards to examining South 
Africa’s achievement of equality since the dawn of democracy. This was drawn 
from social and economic (labour) perspectives. They posited equality right as a 
key-stone which sits as a bedrock to South Africa’s democracy. They also argued 
that equality is pivotal to the success of the country’s transformation and its 
restructuring programmes, without which the other rights in the Bill of Rights will 
become hollow and devoid in meaning. They further illustrated that equality is 
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inherently linked with rights to dignity, life and socio-economic rights, while 
similarly highlighting worries that the slow progress of transformation has a 
potential to inhibit progressive achievement of equality in meaningful terms 
thereby rendering normative framework less effective. In actual fact, they 
acknowledged that the route towards realizing equality has been very slow and thus 
remain distant. In this regard, what is discernible is that there have been some 
unexplained difficulties in terms of shifting from words on paper to effective 
implementation (Pereira, 2014). It was further shown that South Africa desperately 
need a candid exchange and flow of information that can be utilized to foster 
subsistence of equality, while halting discrimination in all spectrums of society.  
The role of judiciary in shaping human rights discourses cannot be understated. It 
is for this reason that courts have been and continue to play significant function in 
modelling equality as a value and a right. Courts have had to grapple with this 
question; does the right to equality necessitates that people be treated equally at all 
times? According to Justice Albie Sachs and Kate O’Regan (former judges of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa), the right to equality does not necessarily 
mean that every person must be treated equally in all circumstances (President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Hugo (1997) 4 SALR 1 (CC): para 41; City Council 
of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC)). Biased to substantive approach, 
they reasoned that our constitutional imperative on equality is premised on 
redistributive justice which is essentially concerned with bettering circumstances of 
the underprivileged majorities. This is because class has been accepted as a 
primary signifier of inequality within the capitalist economic order (Albertyn, 
2011). 
As argued by Faraday et al (2006), the context of this framework illustrates that the 
notion of equality forms an integral part of the widely cherished rights 
indispensable for a proper functionality of any constitutional and human rights 
respecting system. Because South Africa adapted to constitutionalism, it is 
essential to establish how the 1994 transition envisaged effectuating 
transformation, to fulfill the right to equality among others? 
 
5. The post-1994 Regime: Transformative Constitutionalism on 
Equality 
The 1994 transition can best be described as a watershed moment. This era was 
essentially marked by a process of notable paradigm shift in as far as advancing 
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human rights was concerned. It culminated in a system of constitutional supremacy 
that would fundamentally be grounded in law in the Constitution. At the center of 
attention was the need to ensure a comprehensive realization of espoused social 
and substantive justice, and building a nation grounded on protecting established 
democratic values and fundamental human rights (Rapatsa, 2014). It is important to 
establish how transformative constitutionalism envisioned achieving equality, and 
the premise upon which such would be modelled, formal or substantive equality?  
 
5.1. What is Transformative Constitutionalism? 
The phraseology of transformative constitutionalism comprises two distinct 
concepts; transformation and constitutionalism. Plainly, transformation connotes 
‘change’. Thus, because the post-1994 regime adapted to constitutionalism, the 
doctrine governing legitimacy of government action, it had to bring about change. 
This change would be frontrunner in constructing a new legal order, creating equal 
opportunities for all, and space for dialogue where the idea of change is constant, 
and embraces social, economic and legal concerns (Langa, 2006). 
Subsequently, the notion of transformative constitutionalism was coined by Karl 
Klare. He posited it as a “long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation and enforcement committed to transforming a country’s political, 
legal and social institutions, and power relations in a democratic, participatory and 
egalitarian direction” (Klare, 1998). This project has since been touted as a tool 
that induces society’s major social and economic change through non-violent 
processes that are grounded in law. This change had to be made discernible from 
new distinct norms (such as the Bill of Rights in chapter 2 of the Constitution) and 
institutional framework (chapter 9 institutions) established to protect such rights 
and support democracy. According to Karin van Marle (2009), transformative 
constitutionalism enables appropriate constitutional interpretations that foster 
fulfillment of the Constitution’s transformative agenda. This had to also be 
reflected in the manner in which the agenda attempts to reach out to various 
disciplines of scholarship, nurturing the realization of human rights. The central 
function of transformative constitutionalism is notably that, it has to redress 
injustices of the past and guide the nation to a better future (Langa, 2006; Bohler-
Muller, 2007). Moseneke (2007) argued that, if meaningfully applied, 
transformative constitutionalism is capable of ensuring that a comprehensive 
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realization of substantive equality and protection of human dignity of persons 
becomes a reality. 
The crux of transformative constitutionalism can be summed up to be centered on 
the following; It entrenched normative value system and institutional framework 
that aspires to realize equality. It obligated the state to ensure equal access to social 
services (education, health, water, sanitation), equal access to justice (lawful arrest, 
legal representation, fair trial), sustainable development and equal participation in 
public affairs. Therefore, transformative constitutionalism is more inclined to 
achieving substantive equality than formal equality. That is, it seeks to ensure that 
all persons have equal access to sustainable livelihood, even if it means at the 
expense of the state. It envisaged achieving substantive equality in two ways. First, 
by eliminating existing discrimination or discriminatory practices, and second, by 
designing measures, such as affirmative action, to protect and advance previously 
disadvantaged groups of persons (Dupper, 2002). 
 
5.2. Legislative Framework 
To augment efforts of realizing equality in society, legislative framework is 
indispensable as it essentially provides guidance to civil society and courts for 
implementing all rights in the Bill of Rights. As a starting point, discourses on the 
concept of equality derive strength from the constitutional provisions in section 9.
1
 
To effectuate this right to equality, section 9 enshrined it both as a legal right and 
as a value (Small & Grant, 2000). As a legal right, equality is given procedural and 
remedial force. Within this context, it stipulates that everyone is equal before the 
law, and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. The legal nature of 
equality is therefore premised on recognizing it as an entitlement to all persons, 
requiring state respect, protect and enable realization of such right. As a value, it 
finds proponent from the preamble of the Constitution which formulated it in such 
                                                          
1 Equality clause - (l) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. (3) The state 
may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. (4) No person may unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). 
National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. (5) Discrimination 
on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair. 
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a way as to advocate that ‘there be equality between men and women and people of 
all races, where everyone is afforded space to exercise and enjoy fundamental 
rights and freedoms’. This constitute a contrivance to ensure that equality provides 
substance to transformative constitutionalism, as it embodies the hope of 
transforming the past and present, to build a better future. 
Section 9(2) of equality clause entrenched the need for state to design corrective 
measures through statutory and policy initiatives to promote the achievement of 
equality. This became indispensable as a means to particularly address continued 
imbalances and/or discriminatory practices occurring in various spectrums of 
society, which effectively maintained disadvantage over other persons or categories 
of persons. Dupper (2002) considers this extension as the real substantive ambition 
of the Constitution. Subsequently, dedicated legislations were promulgated to 
effectuate equality in society. This refers specifically to the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA; also referred to 
as the Equality Act) and Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA). Equality Act 
is regarded as a central statutory mechanism tasked with advancing transformation 
in all spheres of society to fundamentally redress the legacy of apartheid 
(Liebenberg & O’Sullivan, 2001). This includes supporting the state to alter and 
avert socio-economic difficulties plaguing the majority of inhabitants in under-
developed villages. In general, Equality Act places a positive obligation on the 
state, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, traditional 
institutions and all persons to promote equality. On the other hand, EEA was 
designed to transform employment relations, with the primary objective of 
normalizing the relationship between employers and employees. This was given 
added impetus by the known historical inequalities that characterized labour 
relations, where bargaining power was constantly skewed in favour of employers. 
EEA seeks to ensure redistribution of resources, to mitigate and avert untold 
income disparities in society. 
 
6. Why Equality Remain A Distant Dream? Challenges 
The 27
th
 of April features in South Africa’s history as that distinct day upon which 
attainment of democracy is commemorated. This period regularly indicts us to 
review progress and assess the impact that has been made by transformative 
constitutionalism with regards to achieving equality in society. This is particularly 
important because transformative constitutionalism envisioned achieving equality 
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in its substantive form. In principle, this encompassed the idea of addressing socio-
economic challenges plaguing the majority of previously disadvantaged population 
groups. In the main, this included eliminating the plights of poverty, 
unemployment and inequalities. Indeed, it has been twenty one years since the 
advent of democracy. Thus, have we succeeded in translating equality into reality? 
In this section, major aspects that appear as findings on equality are presented. 
These factors inherently determine whether equality, both as social value and legal 
right, has effectively infused into the system, and meaningfully altered the lives of 
the majority. 
Notwithstanding the presence of appealing and comprehensive normative 
framework on the right to equality, it has been observed that South Africa is far 
from realizing equality in meaningful terms. Social and economic factors are 
conspicuously responsible for this. In fact, it is worth awakening to the reality that 
South Africa’s democratic government is struggling to eradicate the socio-
economic deprivations inherited from apartheid (Sarkin, 1999). Although the 
legacy of apartheid continues to haunt South Africa, and will do so for some 
decades (Vogt, 2001; Liebenberg & O’Sullivan, 2001), it should never be exploited 
as an excuse by the present regime for its failures. Issues of poverty, 
unemployment and inequalities are intrinsic social challenges that remain central in 
determining the nature and extent of access to social services such as education, 
health care and (social) justice. It is for this reason that substantive approach to 
equality is configured on redressing poverty, which lies at the heart of the South 
Africa’s constitutional order. However, poverty has been and remain one of the 
biggest problems in South Africa (Reddy & Sokomani, 2008; Frye, 2013; Lehohla, 
2014).  
The problem of poverty is worsened by high unemployment rate, which has been 
found to affect youth in magnitude. The official unemployment rate is 26.4%, 
whereas expanded unemployment rate is 36.1% (Statistics SA, 2015). The official 
estimate refer only to unemployed work force and active job seekers who are 
willing to work, whereas expanded definition includes those that have abandoned 
job searching efforts, lost hope, and therefore categorized squarely as unemployed. 
Because of pervasive poverty and unemployment, inequalities continue to thrive 
(Mattes, 2012; Kings, 2014). How does inequality manifest in South Africa? 
Inequality appear in a variety of ways, the most common being through pervasive 
disparities of wealth between the rich and the poor. Under such circumstances, 
almost all essential public services have come to be commodified. This effectively 
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entails that people need money in order to secure quality public service. Thus, 
poverty, unemployment and inequalities are responsible for widespread social 
injustices in society (Spreen & Vally, 2006: 352; Coovadia et al, 2009: 824). Sadly, 
the indigent people suffer most, and therefore may never be able to assert their 
right to equality in a meaningful way. 
Compounding these socio-economic problems is the issue of attitudinal theories, 
which is somewhat linked with government policy that play a crucial role in 
determining the fate of equality. This refers to widespread (dualistic) public-private 
service phenomena and the emerging theory of VIPsm. The substantive approach 
to equality entails that transformative constitutionalism had intended to ensure that 
quality public service is accessible to all people. This encompasses unhindered 
access to education, health care, social protection, safety and security and justice. 
Ironically, all these essential public services have been commodified, which means 
that people require huge financial capabilities to fund access to quality essential 
public services. This is arguably resultant from privatization which has effectively 
deprived indigent people in rural communities of access to quality public services. 
For instance, South Africa continues to have a tale of two schools; private schools 
which are considered properly functional, wealthy and able to educate 
learners/students effectively, and public schools which are dysfunctional, poor, 
under-resourced and incapable of equipping leaners with necessary numeracy and 
literacy skills (Spaull, 2013). The quagmire facing public schools evidently appear 
in Section27 and Others v Minister of Education and Another (24565/2012) [2012] 
ZAGPPHC 114 in which the government failed to provide textbooks to affected 
schools even after Kollapen J (High Court) ordered the department of basic 
education to do so. Similar problems are widespread with regards to access to 
quality health care. Public hospitals are dysfunctional, whereas private hospitals 
offer the best of quality health care services, but only accessible to the rich few. 
The problem of dualistic public service system has been given added impetus by 
the growing theory of VIPsm. Human beings have been distinguished into very 
important persons. The disheartening reality is that government spends over R2 
billion to provide safety and security of few individuals, all in pursuit of VIPsm 
(Van Onselen, 2015). Subsequently, this has been embedded in all segments of 
society, effectively rendering equality, both as a value and a right, a mere hollow 
rhetoric. 
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7. Conclusion 
This article has intended to illustrate that South Africa’s post 1994 regime 
embraced equality as one of the founding values of constitutional democracy. 
Thus, that transition from apartheid to democracy was conceivably an excellent 
phenomenon, which culminated in a system that would resonate with the spirit and 
purport of international bill of rights. This it achieved by entrenching human rights 
philosophy at the bedrock of the Constitution. This resulted in South Africa having 
a reasonably good normative value system and institutional framework to support 
constitutional democracy. It is for this reason that South Africa boost global 
recognition as a human rights respecting state. It has been shown that equality 
augments efforts of creating socially admirable livelihood and South Africa’s 
egalitarian aspirations as espoused by transformative constitutionalism, which 
pursues substantive equality. A solid relationship between equality and dignity has 
also been found to be significant in serving distributive justice. This is the essence 
of transformative constitutionalism which is essentially centered on creating a 
system in which law in the Constitution reigns supreme, and pledges to bury 
wounds of the past, to transform the country’s social, moral, legal and political 
landscape. Thus, people are recognized as vital beings that should be afforded 
space to participate fully in shaping democracy in an equitable manner. 
Nonetheless, this article also reveals that South Africa’s chances of achieving 
meaningful change that enables comprehensive realization of substantive equality 
is invariably under threat. This is perceived to originate from persistent 
classification of people (low, middle and high class), a problem which has been 
compounded by triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and incomparable 
inequalities. It is worsened by the fact that essential public service has been 
commodified, essentially being replaced somewhat by a dualistic private-public 
service which notably always serves the rich. Under these circumstances, it has 
been proven that those plagued by poverty in particular, have the slightest 
opportunity to assert and realize their dignity, therefore enjoy other guaranteed 
freedoms and right to equality. It is argued that formal equality has instead 
flourished, because the indigent people have their own level of equality, which is 
evidently incomparable to that of the wealthier people. Succinctly, South Africa’s 
appealing human rights norms are yet to meaningfully be translated into reality, 
and so is the right to equality. 
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